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abstract
Community of inquiry is most often seen as a dialogical procedure for the cooperative
development of reasonable approaches to knowledge and meaning. This reflects a deep
commitment to normatively based reasoning that is pervasive in a wide range of
approaches to critical thinking and argument, where the underlying theory of reasoning is
logic driven, whether formal or informal. The commitment to normative reasoning is
deeply historical reflecting the fundamental distinction between reason and emotion.
Despite the deep roots of the distinction and its canonization in current educational
thought, contemporary cognitive neuroscience presents a fundamental challenge to the
viability of the distinction and thus to any effort that sees education for reasonable
judgment to be based on the remediation of cognition in isolation from its roots in the
emotions. Cognitive neuroscience looks at the deep connections between emotion and
memory, information retrieval, and resistance to refutation. This conforms with earlier
studies in experimental psychology, which showed resistance to changing beliefs in the
face of evidence, including evidence based on personal experience. This paper will look at
the recent research including speculations from neurological modeling that shows the
depth of connection between, emotions, memory and reasoning. It will draw implications
for dialogic thinking within a community of inquiry including systematic self-reflection as
an essential aspect of critical thinking.
keywords: community of inquiry; cognitive psychology; reason and emotion.
sobre la relevância da la neurociência cognitiva para la comunidad de investigación
resumen
La comunidad de investigación se ve a menudo como un procedimiento dialógico para el
desarrollo cooperativo de enfoques razonables de conocimiento y significado. Esto refleja
un profundo compromiso con el razonamiento normativo que está presente en una
amplia gama de enfoques del pensamiento y el argumento crítico, donde la teoría
subyacente del razonamiento se basa en la lógica, ya sea formal o informal. El
compromiso con el razonamiento normativo es profundamente histórico y refleja la
distinción fundamental entre la razón y la emoción. A pesar de las profundas raíces de la
distinción y su canonización en el pensamiento educativo actual, la neurociencia cognitiva
contemporánea presenta un desafío fundamental a la viabilidad de la distinción y, por lo
tanto, a cualquier esfuerzo que considere que la educación para un juicio razonable se
base en la remediación de la cognición aisladamente de su raíces en las emociones La
neurociencia cognitiva analiza las conexiones profundas entre la emoción y la memoria, la
recuperación de información y la resistencia a la refutación. Esto se ajusta a estudios
anteriores en psicología experimental, que mostraron resistencia a las creencias
cambiantes frente a la evidencia, incluida la evidencia basada en la experiencia personal.
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Este texto analizará la investigación reciente que incluye especulaciones de modelos
neurológicos que muestran la profundidad de la conexión entre las emociones, la
memoria y el razonamiento. Dibujará implicaciones para el pensamiento dialógico dentro
de una comunidad de investigación que incluya la autorreflexión sistemática como un
aspecto esencial del pensamiento crítico.
palabras clave: comunidad de investigación; psicología cognitiva; razón y emoción.
sobre a relevância da neurociência cognitiva para a comunidade de investigação
resumo
A comunidade de investigação é mais freqüentemente vista como um procedimento
dialógico para o desenvolvimento cooperativo de abordagens razoáveis de conhecimento
e significado. Isso reflete um profundo compromisso com o raciocínio normativamente
fundamentado que é difundido em uma ampla gama de abordagens para o pensamento e
o argumento críticos, em que a teoria subjacente do raciocínio segue a lógica, formal ou
informal. O compromisso com o raciocínio normativo é profundamente histórico,
refletindo a distinção fundamental entre razão e emoção. Apesar das raízes profundas da
distinção e de sua canonização no pensamento educacional atual, a neurociência cognitiva
contemporânea apresenta um desafio fundamental à viabilidade da distinção e, portanto,
a qualquer esforço que considere a educação como um juízo razoável baseada na
remediação da cognição isolada das suas raízes nas emoções. A neurociência cognitiva
analisa as conexões profundas entre emoção e memória, recuperação da informação e
resistência à refutação. Isso está de acordo com estudos anteriores em psicologia
experimental, que mostraram resistência à mudança de crenças em face de evidências,
incluindo evidências baseadas em experiências pessoais. Este artigo examinará a pesquisa
recente, incluindo especulações de modelagem neurológica que mostra a profundidade
da conexão entre emoções, memória e raciocínio. Ele vai trazer implicações para o
pensamento dialógico dentro de uma comunidade de investigação, incluindo a autoreflexão sistemática como um aspecto essencial do pensamento crítico.
palavras-chave: comunidade de investigação; psicologia cognitiva; razão e emoção.
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introduction
Community of inquiry, in the sense relevant to those interested in
philosophy with children, is most often seen as a procedure for the cooperative
development of reasonable approaches to knowledge and meaning based on
classroom dialogue. Its roots in the work of Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret
Sharp are well known and its deeper roots have been explored by a number of
scholars. A recent effort to ground community of inquiry in a richly articulated
theory of dialogical teaching, supported by a broad survey of supporting
theoretical and empirical studies, includes the following apt characterization:
“dialogic teaching and learning requires an underlying commitment to rational
thinking as a mechanism for formulating better judgments” (Reznitskaya &
Gregory, 2013). This reflects a deep commitment to normatively based reasoning
that is pervasive in a wide range of approaches to critical thinking and argument,
where the underlying theory of reasoning is logic driven, with logic broadly
construed: whether formal logic as in Lipman (1974) or the more nuanced
approach found in informal logicians such as Douglas Walton (1996).
The commitment to normative reasoning is deeply historical reflecting the
fundamental distinction between reason and emotion that is found in Plato and
Aristotle and reflected in the seminal early modern philosophy of Bacon and
Descartes. Despite the deep roots of the distinction and its canonization in current
educational thought (Bloom et. al. 1956) contemporary cognitive neuroscience
presents a fundamental challenge to the viability of the distinction and thus to any
effort that sees education for reasonable judgment to be based on the remediation
of cognition in isolation from its roots in the emotions.
The disconnect between reason and emotion is evident in Lipman’s earliest
work. There is no leading idea on the emotions in the manual for Harry
Stottlemeier’s Discovery, nor is there a listing for emotion in the index of Thinking in
Education. In his discussion of ‘roadblocks to reasoning’ the focus is on the need
for remediation of logical skills (Lipman, 1991, pp. 31-32). Even in his discussion of
racial prejudice, where he sees community of inquiry as a ‘cognitive/affective
childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 15, jan. 2018, pp. 01- 18
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strategies’ he sees the problem in terms of ‘social disorganization’ rather than
rooted in the emotional life of the participants. (op. cit. pp. 257-258). And this,
despite the clear role of biasing emotions in the analysis of prejudice in a key work
that he cites, Hamilton (1981). An example of the sorts of studies done, Hamilton
reports experiments with identical photos of social settings, doctored so that they
appeared as either white or black subjects, and found perception, memory,
inference and judgment to be strongly biased depending on the apparent race of
the people in the photos. Research in belief and attitude change generalized the
findings associated with social bias. People were found to show resistance to
changing beliefs in the face of evidence, including contradictory evidence based
on personal experience (Eiser, 1984). The cognitive model of belief maintenance
seemed unsupportable.
The connection between reasoning and emotions, postulated as early as
Freud, continues to be an active area of research. Research indicates that our past
associations affect our ability to alter all beliefs (Jacoby, et. al, 1989). A study of
political beliefs showed resistance to argument that challenge our memories and
commitments: “the persistence of misinformation might better be understood as
characteristic of human thinking” (Lewandowsky et al., 2012, p. 114). Much of the
available research relevant to the role of emotions in cognition focuses on bias and
stereotyping. For example, the studies of unacknowledged bias indicate “influence
of implicit stereotypes on judgment and behavior.” (Blair, Ma, & Lenton 2001, p.
828). Unacknowledged, such attitudes may remain disconnected from a person's
avowed beliefs: “Dissociations [between implicit and explicit attitudes] are
commonly observed in attitudes toward stigmatized groups, including groups
defined by race, age, ethnicity, disability, and sexual orientation.” (Greenwald &
Krieger 2006, p. 949). Such implicit biases create emotional disturbance when in
the face of social pressure such views are put into question. “When one denies a
personal prejudice (explicit bias) that co-exists with underlying unconscious
negative feelings and beliefs (implicit bias] leading to diffuse negative feelings of
anxiety and uneasiness.” (Dovidio and Gaertner 2005, p. 42).
Problems with a cognitive account of reasoning were already apparent in
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the earlier literature on reasoning, which focused on performance errors,
reasoning that fails to meet normative standards from both deductive and
inductive logic (Kahneman, Slavic &Tversky, 1982, Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).
Counter-normative reasoning, arguably effective in making quick judgments in
real time, was found to be pervasive (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Whatever the failures
of accounts of reasoning that fail to see the complex basis for cognition, cognitive
neuroscience points to the essential grounding of rational thought in extra-logical
mechanisms. Cognitive neuroscience indicates deep connections between emotion
and memory, information retrieval and resistance to refutation.
My first task is to show why neuroscience has exceptional epistemological
power as a basis for understanding human cognition. That done, I will offer a brief
overview of recent developments that show the deep connection between
reasoning and the emotions. Finally, I will draw implications for dialogic thinking
within a community of inquiry. I will be using a model drawn from my analysis of
physical chemistry as a paradigmatic exemplar of a successful inquiry project. I
use the model to look at cognitive neuroscience in order to indicate its potential
scope and power. I then apply the model to community of inquiry in response to
the fundamental entanglement of reason and emotion. My efforts here, to counter
the early and perhaps persistent focus on logical reasoning in those interested in
philosophy with children, should be seen to support the work of Ann Margaret
Sharp, whose focus on the role of emotions in education is among the most
welcome directions towards which the theory and practice of community of
inquiry should be directed (Sharp, 2007).
why neuroscience?
The basis of neuroscience is neurophysiology, a natural science that offers
the potential for a level of warrant that is characteristic of the most deeply
entrenched theories that inquiry has produced, the branching structure of
interlocking explanations grounded in physical chemistry that connects, through
explanatory relationships, scientific understanding that ranges from micro-physics
to organic chemistry, from the material sciences through which we build our
bridges to the micro-chemistry through which we biopsy suspicious moles. The
childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 15, jan. 2018, pp. 01- 18
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physical and chemical understanding of the living brain offers a foundation for
psychology that has enormous potential for explanatory power, even if
confronting the formidable complexity of the bio-chemical structures that the
current understanding of the nervous system increasingly exposes.

The

explanatory power of a physicalist account of the mind is apparent in the
epistemological structures upon which physical chemistry is based. I have
attempted to capture image of that power in a model of emerging truth
(Weinstein, 2013) based on the structure of physical chemistry. This is a departure
from the standard analysis of scientific method in terms of deductive or inductive
logic, which I believe has consequences for the goals and procedures within
community of inquiry. I turn to this in the final section of the paper.
Physical chemistry exhibits an explanatory structure that includes three
highly intuitive epistemological properties: consilience breadth and depth
(Weinstein, 2011).

These three are the core of the epistemological power of

scientific theorizing seen as productive of emerging truth. The first, consilience,
requires that theories are increasingly supported by a body of evidence that is
improving in scope and detail.

Breadth requires that a theory explains an

increasing number of diverse phenomena, and depth requires that a theory is
reinterpreted in terms of by higher-order explanatory frameworks that connect it
to other theories of increasing breadth and increasing evidentiary adequacy.
These epistemological characteristics, were first exemplified by physical chemistry
in the mid 1800’s. And despite a history of false starts, misleading empirical data
and over-stated arguments, with the elaboration of the periodic table of elements
in the 20th century, physical chemists were able to offer a unified and highly
coherent body of branching explanatory structures, that ranges from microphysics to cosmology, from the basic properties of matter to the complexity of the
living cell (Sceri, 2007). Cognitive science, viewed through the epistemological
perspective that looks to consilience, breadth and depth seems, even in its infancy,
to exhibit similar potential for explanatory power (Weinstein, 2015).
Cognitive science begins with a level of theoretic articulation exemplified
by Chomsky (1957) and called on the resources of logic and computer science. This
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mirrors the epistemological context of early atomic theory. Cognitive scientists,
like early chemists had a basic theoretic perspective that permitted mathematical
articulation.

Rather than look at behavior alone. Cognitive scientists built

theoretic models that accounted for the behavior in terms of functional models
based on theoretic constructs (Gardner, 1987). This placed cognitive science in a
position of indefinite growth. And the promise of increasingly sophisticated
computer simulations of mind offered possibilities for the description of the
complex theoretic structures put forward. Complex descriptions that require
computer modeling for their articulation offers a test of consilience unlike
anything in the prior history of psychology. Computer simulations of interactions
employed theoretic constructs based on a vastly increased knowledge of the
structure of the brain, available through powerful advances in instrumentation,
brain scans of various sorts. This enabled the analysis of the range of cognitive
behaviors.
We do not know which theories in cognitive science are correct, but if they
can be developed consistent with the available evidence they have the potential to
grow in scope and detail as the theoretic predictions of ever-finer models of
complex systems can be ascertained through computer simulations corresponding
to the increasingly detailed experimental knowledge of the brain. Like early
physical chemistry, we don’t know which theories in cognitive science are true,
but if a theory continues to yield important explanations, the potential for a
growing and all-encompassing theoretic structure of psychology becomes
plausible.
In the history of physical chemistry, the increasing degree of articulation in
the details that chemical theories explained-- what we call 'consilience,' was
combined with breadth, that is, with the scope of a theory. Cognitive science is, if
nothing else, exceptionally broad in the scope of its concerns. The Cambridge
Handbook of Cognitive Science (Frankish and Ramsey, 2012) lists eight related
research areas that reflect different aspects of cognition, including perception,
action, learning and memory, reasoning and decision making, concepts, language,
emotion and consciousness. In addition, they list four broad area that extend the
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reach of cognitive science from human cognition standardly construed to include
animal cognition, evolutionary psychology, the relation of cognition to social
entities and artifacts and most essential, the bridge between cognitive science and
the rest of physical science: cognitive neuroscience. Each of these is a going
concern, and none of them is free of difficulties. Yet in all cases there is a sense of
advance, of wider and more thoughtful articulation of theoretical perspectives that
address a growing range of cognitive concerns.
The key to the epistemological power of cognitive science is its foundation
in neuro-science, which gives depth to even speculative theories. Speculations of
instantiated neural mechanisms have systemic power much greater than their
evidentiary weights. For their enterprise, bridging between fundamental precognitive processes such as physiological control and emotions to build the
functional potential for memory and cognition offers deep structural warrants
when supported by reliable evidence and accepted theories. Although speculative
and possibly inadequate physiologically based theories offer enormous potential
epistemic power. Their materialist assumptions point to the deep reduction to
physiology, neurobiology, biochemistry and electrochemistry, offering a coherent
ontology consistent with the rest of science. And this is despite the enormous gap
between the simple models of neurological activity proffered and the brute facts of
the living brain: 30 billion neurons making countless trillions of connections and
sensitive to a wide array of known biochemical agents, with more perhaps to
come.
cognition and emotions
There are neural mechanisms that account for persistence of biasing
phenomena such as the persistence of beliefs in the face of counter-evidence (Eiser,
1984, Jacoby, et. al, 1989) and implicit bias (Dovidio and Gaertner 2005). The
prefrontal cortex which processes conscious thought and the so-called “executive
functions,” planning, goal setting, evaluation, and cognitive control is connected
to other parts of the brain organizing input together into a coherent whole. Under
the prefrontal cortex is the orbitofrontal cortex, which broadly supports selfregulation: physical, cognitive, emotional and social. These regions combine
8
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inputs to create the image of our physical body as well as perceptions of the
external world and mental constructs (Dehaene, 2014). An interesting detail
relevant for social cognition are so called “mirror neurons,” neurons that fire both
when you act and when you perceive another performing the same action and
which allow us to infer or predict others’ intentions (Iacoboni, et. al. 2005).
Research indicates that mirroring of emotions, the degree of empathy we show
others, is modifiable by real or perceived social relationships supporting ethnic or
gender stereotypes (Amodio & Devine, 2006). There is evidence that biasing
emotions reach deep into our biographies and are expressed in implicit biases.
Evidence indicates that “early and affective experiences may influence automatic
evaluations more than explicit attitudes. In addition, there is growing evidence
that systemic, culturally held can bias people’s automatic evaluations” regardless
of their expressed personal opinion. (Rudman, 2004, p. 81). Childhood based
biases cause strong reaction such as fear of unfamiliar others, which has been
correlated with activation in the amygdala (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji 2008).
Biases interfere, on a neural level, with the ability to experience others.
When “European-American subjects looked at the face of another EuropeanAmerican, there was a larger neural response than when they looked at AfricanAmerican faces (Lebrecht, et. al., 2009, p. 3). The result: “people do not mentally
simulate the actions of [members of] outgroups. Their mirror-neuronsystems are
less responsive to outgroup members than to ingroup members” (Gutsell and
Inzlicht 2010, p. 844). Such results have been generalized in a theory of the
“automaticity” of higher mental functions sees ordinary cognition as dependent
on environmental and social factors (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Evans (2008) offers
a complex image of the interaction between what he terms unconscious and
conscious cognition, seeing a variety of distinct and possibly incompatible
systems. The work continues with the development of neural models that indicate
the integration of cognition and emotion through abstract structures based on the
known physiology of the brain. We turn to two such accounts, the ambitious
attempts of Thagard and Aubie, (2008) and Damasio (2010) to bridge the gap
between abstract structure and available physiological knowledge.
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Thagard and Aubie draw upon both neurophysiology and computer
modeling. This enables both theoretic depth and the possibility of increasing
adequacy, even if the latter is no more that computer simulations of simplified
cognitive tasks. They cite ANDREA, a model which “involves the interaction of at
least seven major brain areas that contribute to evaluation of potential actions: the
amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral pre-frontal
cortex, the ventral striatum, midbrain dopaminergic neurons, and serotonergic
neurons centered in the dorsal raphe nucleus of the brainstem” (Thagard and
Aubie, 2008, p. 815). With ANDREA as the empirical basis, they construct
EMOCON, which models emotional appraisals, based on a model of explanatory
coherence, in terms of 5 key dimensions that determine responses: valance,
intensity, change, integration and differentiation (pp. 816ff). EMOCON employs
parallel constraint satisfaction based on a program, NECO, which provide
elements needed to construct systems of artificial neural populations that can
perform complex functions (p. 824ff. see pp. 831 ff. for the mathematical details).
This points to the potential power of their approach. Computer models, even if
gross simplifications, permit of ramping up. A logical basis with a clear
mathematical articulation has enormous potential descriptive power as evidenced
by the history of physical science.
Damasio (2010) has a similarly ambitious program. He begins with the
brain’s ability to monitor primordial states of the body, for example, the presence
of chemical molecules (interoceptive), physiological awareness, such as the
position of the limbs (proprioceptive), and the external world based on perceptual
input (extroceptive). He construes this as the ability to construct maps and
connects these functions with areas of the brain based on current research (pp.
74ff.). This becomes the basis for his association of maps with images defined in
neural terms, which will ground his theory of the conscious brain.
Given that much he gives an account of emotions elaborating on his earlier
work, but now connecting emotions with perceived feelings. As with the
association of maps and images, Damasio associates emotions with feeling and
offers the following account: “Feeling of emotions are composite perceptions of (1)

10
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a particular state of the body, during actual or simulated emotion, and (2) a state
of altered cognitive resources and the deployment of certain mental scripts” (p.
124). As before he draws upon available knowledge of the physiology of
emotional states but the purpose of the discussion is not an account of emotions
per se, but rather to ground the discussion of memory, which becomes the core of
his attempt at a cognitive architecture (pp. 339ff.). The main task is to construct a
system of information transfer within the brain and from the body the brain. The
model is, again, mediated by available physiological fact and theory about brain
function and structure. The main theoretic construct in his discussion of memory
is the postulation of ‘convergence-divergence zones’ (CDZs), which store ‘mental
scripts’ (pp. 151ff.). Mental scripts are the basis of the core notion of stored
‘dispositions,’ which he construes as ‘know-how’ that enables the ‘reconstruction
of explicit representation when they are needed” (p. 150). Like maps (images) and
emotions (feelings) memory requires the ability of parts of the brain to store
procedures that reactivate prior internal states when triggered by other parts of
the brain or states of the body. Dispositions, unlike images and feelings are
unconscious, ‘abstract records of potentialities’ (p. 154) that enable retrieval of
prior images, feelings and words through a process of reconstruction based in
CDZs, what he calls ‘time-locked retroactivation’ (p. 155). CDZs form feedforward
loops with, e.g. sensory information and feedback to the place of origination in
accordance with coordinated input from other CDZs via convergence-divergence
regions (CDRegions) by analogy with airport hubs (pp. 154ff.). Damasio indicates
empirical evidence in primate brains for such regions and zones (p. 155) and offers
examples of how the architecture works in understanding visual imagery and
recall (pp. 158ff.).
Damasio like Thagard and Aubie offer speculative models that reference
current physiological knowledge, rely on concepts from computer science and
information theory and bypass the deep philosophical issues that are seen by
many to create an unbridgeable gap between the mental and the physical short of
deep metaphysical reorientation (Chalmers, 1996). Yet, whatever the ultimate
verdict on these two authors, the rich program in cognitive science persists and

childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 15, jan. 2018, pp. 01- 18

issn 1984-5987

11

on the relevance of cognitive neuroscience for community of inquiry

has a strong appeal. The reason is the potential strength of the warrants, that is to
say, if such models prove to be correct the epistemic force of the warrants that
support them will be enormous, swamping the force of alternative approaches
that rely on, for example, psychological evidence alone.
cognitive neuroscience and community of inquiry
The consequences of neurophysiology and the cognitive science it supports
for community of inquiry point to a direction already undertaken. That is, the
movement from a logical account of reasonableness to a richer human-centered
sense of how to support the process the community of inquiry may be seen to
engender. Matthew Lipman’s broad agenda including critical, creative and caring
thinking when seen within a dialogical community of inquiry includes an essential
human element and the decades of cognitive psychologists now supported by
advances in understanding the neural mechanism tells us that cognition,
reasoning, evaluating evidence and even identifying the critical questions that
need to be asked is a human process that engages with complex activities of the
brain. And as such transcends the normative ideal of reasonableness no matter
how construed.

On the psychological level, there is deep engagement with

concepts based on neural overlap between the executive functions associated with
complex reasoning and the power of connections among ideas, cemented through
emotional responses that govern every aspect of the cognitive process. This causes
emotional components in what we see, what we remember, how we remember
and how deeply entrenched the ideas are within complexes of ideas that form the
basis for our sincere beliefs and what we do with them.
Philosophical community of inquiry must address the values inherent in
dialogical practices if it is to be more than expressive. Some commitment to
normativity is required and the is of emotional connections must be weighed
against the ought of any disciplined philosophical practice that uses normatively
compelling procedures to achieve normatively sanctioned ends. How then to
bridge between the logical and epistemological intuitions that govern normatively
constrained discourse and the brute fact of emotional entanglement. This is a
challenge to any naturalistic account of thinking, if only because it tends towards

12
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relativism and Harvey Siegel (1987) an advocate of normatively driven critical
thinking has, to my mind, shown the incoherence of such a view. Siegel’s
arguments are simple, any argument for relativism is either merely relatively true
or incoherent, since if the argument for relativism is more than merely relatively
true than not all arguments are merely relatively true. The point for education is
that we must struggle towards some objective reasonable standpoint, one for
which giving reasons is required (Siegel, 1988). But how is this possible if all
cognitive functions associated with reasoning are conditioned by emotional
weights, if the very cognitive mechanisms that support our functions are
distorting and biasing the evidence as we collect it, qualifying our memories and
information processing, determining the weight of our commitments through
organizing schema with which the brains encodes, stores and selectively retrieves?
All of this impinges on the executive functions that drive our reasoning. Our
arguments express who we are in the most profound sense.
I find a solution in a better understanding of how successful inquiry works.
How despite the vagaries of the individuals involve, their jealousies, their cultural
and professional prejudices, the limits on individual’s knowledge and
competence, and despite the biases manifested in institutional policy and practice
added to the litany of emotional barriers to reasoning, a science like chemistry has
managed to achieve the highest degree of epistemological warrant, increasing
both practical application and theoretic understanding. Scientists, seen in
aggregate as communities of inquiry, form institutions that modulate individual
differences through a focus on the evolving ideas and practices. Scientists may be
illogical or even crazy, but science must be coherent and successful. Scientific
communities were part of the original conception of community of inquiry in
pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, but it may seem a dubious model for
the philosophical community of inquiry. And so, we must be suspicious of the
logical and dialogical apparatus that is drawn from an objective search for
knowledge.
Given my analysis of chemical inquiry much of the traditional logical
concern is replaced by the triad of epistemological criteria: increasing consilience,
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breadth and depth over time. How can this be applied to philosophical
communities of inquiry? Breadth and depth seem to have an intuitive connection
to the emerging inquiry as dialogue continues. Breadth refers to the range of
topics, depth to the reinterpretation based on conceptual advance. An obvious
problem is consilience, in science, increasingly adequate empirical generalizations.
Successful scientific inquiries form chains of experiments, models, explanations
and applications. These increase over time in detail and variety, which results,
among other things, in increase in empirical knowledge. More important these
empirical results and the theories that explain them are supported by chains of
explanations, new frameworks for understanding and advancing knowledge.
Notice that this is not some even flow of success even in the most successful
inquiry projects. The history of chemistry shows inconsistencies, lack of evidence
and ignorance of appropriate methods. All of which were apparent to those
engaged in the inquiry (Scerri, 2007). Yet inquiry persisted with the concomitant
growth of breadth and depth of understanding. Can this be generalized for
philosophical community of inquiry in the broad array educational contexts to
which those interested in philosophy with children are concerned? And to return
of the focus of the paper, how does standards such of these enable us to resolve
our predicament given the complexity of cognitive functions that neurocognitive
science describes. What I will try indicate is how the scientific metacriteria can
replace the standard logical concerns, whether formal or informal.
Given the idiosyncrasy with which our evidence is obtained and stored the
most our arguments can be taken for are suggestions, possible avenues for the
continuing inquiry. They enter into the dialogues as points of view, contributions
that claim relevance to the ongoing inquiry. This is exemplified in the history of
chemistry, where passionate dialogues over time and distance slowly evolved as
key ideas were transported and modified into new configurations and more
productive inquiry. Like science, standpoints in the philosophical community of
inquiry are suggestions, opportunities for engagement, and so instead of logical or
epistemological flaws we can look for the location from which a dialogical move is
made. Dialogue seen as contrasting points of view presented for consideration
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enable responses across the range of speech acts and in so doing create modify or
remove cognitive/emotive constructions by the participants as the dialogue
moves forward. As the group forms and reforms perspectives the scope of the
dialogue expends, offering examples and making analogies, explaining and
challenging

perspectives,

connecting

with

other

issues,

exploring

new

information. The analogue to breadth and depth in scientific inquiry is the variety
of opinion and its configuration and reconfiguration as people, through dialogue
in a community of inquiry, see in each other’s perspectives something worth
considering and the value of striving for deeper understand of themselves and the
issues they embrace.
I think there is no easy analogue to consilience. But consilience should be
seen as more than empirical confirmation. Looking again at the history of
chemistry, as the inquiry progressed empirical outcomes were transient and open
to modification. Until the discovery of isotopes there was no hope of finding
empirical results that uniformly conformed to the theory (Scerri, 2007, pp. 41-41).
Rather, the ability to improve empirical adequacy reflecting conceptual growth
and deepening understanding (Scerri, 2007, pp. 176ff). Communities of inquiry
must learn to live with incompleteness. Psychologists tell us part of the reason
why this is the case for humans in general and scientific communities of inquiry
are no exception. Even the most successful inquiry, physical chemistry, shows the
inevitability of local inadequacy. False steps abound as each scientist reflects her
local situation, his opportunities, her competence, his experiences, her
commitments. Truth is not there to be seen in particular positions. Prout’s
hypothesis, which correctly saw hydrogen as the unit basis of the periodic table of
elements was rejected on the available evidence as ‘pure illusion’ (Scerri, p. 41). If
we judge by chemistry, truth emerges slowly, if at all. So, in the community of
inquiry each individual perspective is to be considered, accepted, modified,
challenged, disregarded, reevaluated, remembered for later, temporarily forgotten
or even gone forever. The value in the science is in the process and its outcomes.
Local inadequacy is the rule not the exception. How can a philosophical
community of inquiry hope for more?
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Immersed in philosophical inquiry, dealing with questions that transcend
both experience and understanding the value is in the act of inquiry itself, the
commitment to inquiry and care for the diversity and sensitivity of points of view
in the dialogue. The intellectual task is to be open to possibilities of
reinterpretation, indications that the inquiry can be deepened, extended or
applied. This is closer to Vygotsky than Piaget, Paulo Freire than Robert Ennis,
closer to Ann Margaret Sharp’s evolution than Matthew Lipman’s starting point.
But it is not some relativist alternative to clear logical thinking. For it is based on
an objectively supportive paradigm, the function of communities of inquiry in
areas of science where, both originally and hopefully in the future, they can serve
for an alternative concept of how order is obtained without imposing the pseudodiscipline of, often poorly understood concepts from logic, whether formal or
informal. Formal logic rules are not easy to apply when the concern is actual
discourse. Informal fallacies reflect complex argumentative structures; Douglas
Walton writes entire books on particular fallacies (Walton, 1992 is an example).
Formal logic has moved beyond its fetish with consistency; paraconsistent and
defeasible logics work with contradictions and challenges (Bremer, 2005). But the
adequacy with which logic is understood and applied in classroom dialogues is
the least of the problem. For what is the effect of a logical challenge on
interlocutors? “You are being illogical” is tantamount to exclusion from the
discourse. How is creative and caring thinking supported by using fallacy labels
as rhetorical thrusts? Does brandishing logical dicta lead to sensitive and nuanced
criticisms of oneself and others? This leads us into murky waters
The test of a community of inquiry is how it flourishes. In science
flourishing is obvious from great success, but only over time and in retrospect.
The history of science points to conceptual growth as well as empirical adequacy
as indications of potential success. The former readily imports into philosophical
communities of inquiry in terms of my criteria of breadth and depth, extending
tendencies already apparent in the theory and practice of community of inquiry as
if moves away from logic driven evaluations of dialogue, evaluating the richness
of the interactions, the growth of understanding. But the latter, consilience, moves
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us into another arena. Consilience connects science to the world of human action.
Science is characterized by activity, both in its process and in its outcomes. A
traditional philosophical community of inquiry has no material goals beyond the
clarification of ideas. But the model of science calls for some application of the
discussion

to

definable

projects

that

reflect

the

discussion

and

more

controversially to projects that extend beyond the realm of thought and constitute
some intervention in the world. Science points community of inquiry to useful and
tangible outcomes. Reminiscent of John Dewey, a community of inquiry seeking to
address external issues of school, community and society, sees dialogue as
supporting tangible efforts to make a difference. Consilience, the accomplishment
of external goals thus, as in science, becomes a check to the weaknesses and
extravagances that characterize the image of thought and deliberation that
cognitive neuroscience exposes. As in Paulo Freire communities of inquiry see the
necessary connection between dialogue and acting in the world. And so, emotions
move from being blocks to rational discussion to being goads to accomplishing
worthwhile goals.
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